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Explaining party positions on decentralization 
 
Abstract 
This article argues that the preferences of state-wide parties regarding the decentralization of 
authority are related to their positions on the economic and cultural dimensions of political 
competition. This is because debates about decentralization can raise cultural questions of 
identity but also economic questions of redistribution and efficiency. However, country contexts 
may determine whether and how decentralization is linked to the two dimensions. A statistical 
analysis using data from thirty-one countries shows that the positions of state-wide parties on 
decentralization are linked to their positions on the economic and cultural dimensions. However, 
the association between economic ideology and views on decentralization is conditioned by 
country context, in particular the degree of regional self-rule, the extent of regional economic 
disparity and the ideology of regionalist parties.  These findings have implications for our 
understanding of politics in systems of multi-level governance by offering insight into how 
ideology, rooted in a specific country context, shapes the ‘mind-set’ of agents responsible for 
determining the actual territorial distribution of power.
2 
 
Introduction 
In the past decades, established democracies have been marked by the transfer of political 
power away from the national level. While much attention has been paid to supranational (and 
particularly European) integration, in many states the decentralization of governance is an 
equally important phenomenon: over the past fifty years, the migration of authority to the 
regional level has been an unmistakable trend across developed countries that has led to 
important processes of constitutional reform.1 As Marks et al. note, ‘Not every country has 
become regionalized, but where we see reform over time, it is in the direction of greater, not 
less, regional authority.’
2
 
Structural approaches to decentralization that privilege social , economic and historical 
factors can explain the pressures for establishing ‘congruence’ between state and society. But, 
given their focus on deeply-rooted factors, they overlook the role of political agency and thus 
cannot account for the timing, rhythm and scope of territorial reforms that transfer authority to 
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regions.
3
 Structural perspectives are valuable insofar as they set the stage for examining the 
role of  partisan actors which incarnate social and territorial cleavages, take the decision to 
decentralize power  and establish‘congruence’, and whose preferences are therefore central to 
understanding the dynamics of decentralization. Decentralisation has in fact become an 
important issue of political debate and electoral competition: while some state-wide political 
parties have endorsed the transfer of authority to regional governments, others have opposed 
it. What lies behind the positions that parties take on this issue?  
This question has so far received scant attention in the literature. This stands in 
contrast to party positioning on European integration, which has been studied extensively.
4
 So 
far, a cross-national analysis exists only for the salience of decentralization in Britain, Italy 
and France
5
; another study
6
 considers the position and salience on the regionalist issue of the 
Socialist and Conservative parties of Spain during regional and state elections. 
Understanding the positions of state-wide parties on decentralization is important, 
since decentralization touches the core of politics, namely the power of the state to make and 
execute laws. However, the study of multi-level governance has too often been a ‘party-free’ 
area of inquiry that has mainly studied the vertical and horizontal interactions of actors in the 
policy process.7 Similarly, neo-classical approaches to the distribution of authority have 
treated decentralization as a depoliticized question, reducible to the establishment of an 
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optimal number of territorial jurisdictions.
8
 Yet, the evidence from recent processes of 
constitutional reforms in different countries such as Belgium, Germany, Italy, Spain or the 
United Kingdom shows that the territorial distribution of authority is deeply contested by 
political parties.  
In this article, we focus on state-wide parties. Since they usually form the core of 
national governments, they strongly influence when and how changes to the territorial 
distribution of authority are implemented.9 This means that the positions of state-wide parties 
on jurisdictional questions are central to understanding political outcomes on decentralization. 
Thus, as Marks and Hooghe argue, it is important to ‘place politics – contestation about the 
good society – at the centre of a theory of authority allocation’.
10
  
 We ask what explains the positions of state-wide parties on decentralization. Our 
central argument is that views on this issue are related to preferences on the two core 
ideological dimensions of party competition, the economy and culture.11 This is because 
decentralization is a jurisdictional question relating to the nature of governance which, 
following Hooghe and Marks’s post-functionalist theory of integration, raises questions of 
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efficiency and redistribution on the one hand, and questions of identity on the other.
12
  
Specifically, we argue that parties on the economic right should favour 
decentralization because it can improve the efficient production of public goods, while parties 
on the economic left should oppose decentralization because it hinders efforts to redistribute 
wealth. In contrast, culturally liberal parties should support decentralization because it 
recognizes diversity and local decision-making, while culturally conservative parties should 
be against decentralization because it erodes national unity and territorial integrity. For some 
parties, the two dimensions are consistent in determining positions on decentralization; for 
others, they may lead to internal ideological tensions. To understand the ideological 
foundations of a party’s position on decentralization, we thus need to know its views on both 
key dimensions of political conflict. In this, party positions on decentralization are similar to 
views on European integration.13 
We test this claim using data for thirty-one countries from the Benoit and Laver expert 
survey supplemented with party- and country-level data.
14
 We find strong support for our 
argument that, in general, decentralization taps into the logics of efficiency and redistribution 
on the one hand and identity on the other: overall, positions on the issue are clearly related to 
both the economic and the cultural dimensions.  
However, we also argue that this general association should differ across countries. 
This is because each country has different institutional, structural or strategic characteristics 
that influence whether decentralization is seen primarily through an economic or a cultural 
lens. While questions of territorial authority always have the potential to address the logics of 
efficiency, redistribution and identity, how these logics shape actual party positions should 
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therefore depend on country context. We suggest that decentralization positions are more 
influenced by economic ideology where regional self-rule and economic disparity are high, 
and our analyses confirm this. We also find evidence that the nature of ideological 
competition from regionalist parties can affect whether and which state-wide parties support 
or oppose decentralization. Finally, the relationship of decentralization to the cultural 
dimension appears to depend little on country context. 
 This paper is structured as follows. We start by elaborating our theoretical framework 
and presenting our expectations concerning party positions on decentralization and the effects 
of ideological and contextual factors. We then present the data and the statistical model before 
describing our results. We conclude by drawing implications for future research on the 
determinants of party positions on decentralization and of territorial reform processes. 
 
Decentralization and ideological dimensions 
Our argument that the positions taken by state-wide parties on the issue of decentralization are 
related to the core ideological dimensions of competition builds on the post-functionalist 
theory of integration developed by Hooghe and Marks, which transcends the notion that the 
allocation of authority is an efficiency-oriented outcome driven by functional pressures and 
posits instead that it is a deeply political choices conditioned by domestic conflicts.15 They 
note that ‘[g]overnance has two entirely different purposes’: the first is to supply public 
goods, for example by increasing efficiency and redistributing resources; the second is to 
express a sense of identity with a specific territorial political community.   
This distinction highlights the notion that decentralization is a multi-dimensional 
concept.16 The first goal of governance relates to material values, implies a distributional logic 
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of contestation and is expressed through the economic dimension of party competition. There 
are three institutional components to territorial autonomy that touch upon questions of 
efficiency and redistribution: legislative autonomy on an exclusive, concurrent or shared 
basis; control over administrative resources such as personnel and agencies; and control over 
financial resources either in the form of central transfers or ‘own’ revenues.
17
  
The second goal of governance relates to ‘pre-material’ values, implies an identity-
based logic of contestation and is expressed through the cultural dimension.18 In practice, this 
cultural component of decentralization may be expressed through normative debates 
surrounding, for example, the definition of the political community or the recognition of 
national pluralism through symbolic gestures or asymmetric territorial autonomy.  
Decentralization is therefore a multifaceted process that can address questions of efficiency 
and redistribution linked to economic preferences as well as questions of identity linked to 
cultural preferences. We elaborate on this below. 
 
Decentralization and the economic dimension 
The two economic questions related to decentralization are thus: how does it affect the 
efficiency of governance, and how does it affect the distribution of wealth and welfare? Those 
on the economic right often welcome decentralized decision-making as it can allow for a 
more efficient form of government. In one view, policy-making should be decentralized as far 
as is necessary for the production of public goods to reflect local preferences.
19
 A related 
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argument states that decentralized forms of government are conducive to ‘market preserving 
federalism’20 by creating economic competition between jurisdictions and by limiting the 
ability of the central government to encroach on the market. It is argued that such features 
have positive effects on economic growth. These arguments resonate with right-wing 
economic ideology, as they suggest that minimizing the writ of central government is 
necessary to ensure efficiency in policy-making and economic prosperity. They reflect the 
thinking of parties on the economic right, such as the German Liberal party and the US 
Republican party, which have consistently sought to restore or increase the autonomy of the 
federal states. 
Because decentralization removes power from central government, it may also hinder 
the extent to which a country can undertake redistribution between its citizens. As a result, 
decentralization may prevent key policy goals of the economic left – i.e. inter-territorial and 
individual equality – from being implemented. As Wildavsky puts it, ‘federalism means 
inequality’
21
: decentralization can generate regional economic disparities in a variety of 
outcomes, such as economic growth, educational attainment or welfare state provision, 
because it limits the ability of central government to redistribute wealth and provide universal 
public services.22 Just as the logic of efficiency means that the economic right may be in 
favour of decentralization, the logic of redistribution means that parties on the economic left, 
such as the Australian or British Labour parties, may oppose it.
23
 Specifically, our resulting 
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hypothesis is: 
H1: The more economically right-wing a party is, the more it will support decentralization. 
 
Decentralization and the cultural dimension 
The main cultural question related to decentralization is: how does it reflect the distribution of 
territorial identities and political communities across a country? Culturally liberal parties, 
including for instance most ecological parties, are likely to favour decentralization. There are 
two reasons for this. First, culturally liberal parties are often committed to fostering 
multiculturalism and defending political minorities, and decentralization allows the 
institutions of a polity to be congruent with the distinct identities and aspirations of its 
different communities. In this, cultural liberals may be spurred on by their opposition to the 
positions of culturally conservative parties.24 Second, the support of culturally liberal parties 
may also stem from post-materialist values when decentralization is seen as a way to improve 
the quality of democracy by enhancing civic participation, fostering political deliberation, and 
augmenting the accountability of decision-makers.
25
 As Marks et al. note, the process of 
regionalization in the 1970s coincided with the cultural shift towards post-materialism, which 
challenged conventional norms such as ‘centralized decision-making’.26  
 In contrast, culturally conservative parties, such as the Partido Popular in Spain or the 
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Greater Romania Party, will oppose the decentralization of power. Cultural conservatism 
implies a commitment to preserving the existing order on political, social and cultural issues. 
Parties with such views generally praise traditional values such as the nation, identify with a 
single national political community and regard the recognition of cultural diversity as a source 
of erosion for the integrity of the national community and democratic citizenship. In addition, 
they emphasize the hierarchical nature of political authority and are thus suspicious of any 
mass involvement in (local) politics that may threaten political stability and elite-based 
decision-making.  In sum, our expectation is that culturally liberal parties will support 
decentralization while culturally conservative parties will oppose it. More specifically, our 
hypothesis is:  
H2: The more culturally liberal a party is, the more it will support decentralization. 
 
Decentralization and Contextual Factors 
The way in which decentralization raises questions of efficiency, redistribution and identity 
will vary across countries in function of their social and territorial divisions, institutional 
setting, and structure of political competition. Such factors will influence the sensitivity of 
individual parties to wealth creation and distribution as well as to identity claims, and thus 
shape how they interpret and position themselves on the issue of decentralization and 
determine how decentralization is linked to the economic or cultural dimension. Here, we 
examine the effects of four potentially important differences between countries: the degree of 
self-rule; the degree of regional economic disparity; the presence of regionally-based ethnic 
groups; and the ideology of regionalist parties. 
 
Degree of regional self-rule 
How the economic dimension determines party positions on decentralization may depend on 
the existing degree of regional self-rule and the moment of territorial restructuring at which a 
11 
 
country is situated.
27
 This is because the existing level of self-rule may affect whether the 
issue of decentralization is likely to raise questions of efficiency and redistribution. When a 
country has a high degree of regional self-rule and when decentralization touches upon 
taxation powers and welfare functions, the issue may be seen largely through the lens of 
redistribution and efficiency, as was the case for example with the fiscal equalization reforms 
of Switzerland in 2001 or those of Germany in 2009. Decentralization will be endorsed by 
economically right-wing parties, because they will favour institutional changes that prevent 
the central government from imposing higher levels of taxation on richer regions and from 
interfering with regional governments’ economic policies. It will be opposed by economically 
left-wing parties critical of the effect of high levels of self-rule on the ability of the central 
government to redistribute wealth and ensure uniform outcomes in social service provision. 
Thus, our first contextual hypothesis is: 
H3: The greater the level of regional self-rule, the stronger the association between the 
economic dimension and positions on decentralization. 
 
Regional economic disparity 
The influence of economic ideology on the positioning of parties may also depend on the 
degree of economic disparity between regions within a state. Economic production can be 
strongly regionalized, and this can lead to substantial regional disparities in economic wealth, 
evident in the success of wealthy power-houses such as Baden-Württemberg, Catalonia, 
Lombardy and Rhône-Alpes, whose prowess contrasts with poorer regions of each country.
 28
 
In countries with large economic disparities, decentralization raises questions of efficiency 
and redistribution. Economically strong regions may favor decentralization because it allows 
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them to retain their wealth and their economic model, while weaker regions will plead for the 
redistribution of economic gains across the country.29  
  We expect that in countries with such disparities, state-wide parties will adopt 
positions on decentralization that reflect their attitudes towards wealth, redistribution and 
equality. Thus, parties on the economic right are likely to welcome decentralization because it 
provides regions with control over the resources necessary for encouraging growth, such as 
investment in human capital, communication and transport networks30 and because it is 
conducive to creating an optimal link between fiscal policy and the provision of public goods 
that reflect the ideal preference of the regional median voter.
31
 Parties on the economic left 
will oppose decentralization, since they will support a tighter fiscal union that ensures 
redistribution from wealthy to poorer citizens and regions. For example, during the reform of 
territorial financing of Germany in 2009, the Liberal and Christian Democratic parties 
supported decentralization to a greater extent than the sceptical Social Democratic party. 
Thus, our second contextual hypothesis is:  
H4: The greater the degree of regional economic disparity, the greater the association 
between the economic dimension and positions on decentralization.  
 
Regionally-based ethnic groups 
How decentralization links to the cultural dimension may depend on the presence of 
regionally-based ethnic groups that display distinct cultural and political identities and 
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articulate different policy preferences.
32
  The presence of regionally-based ethnic groups, such 
as the Scots in the UK, the Corsicans in France or the Basques in Spain, will enhance the 
appeal of the logic of identity. This means that the topic of decentralization may be part of 
broader ‘ethnicization’ of politics.
33
 As a result, decentralization in such countries deals 
mostly with the symbolic recognition of national pluralism and the establishment of structures 
of regional government that map onto national communities. 
The way state-wide parties take positions on decentralization depends on whether they 
support the aspirations of regionally-based ethnic groups. Given our theoretical approach, we 
expect that the support for decentralization should be more closely linked to the cultural 
dimension. Culturally liberal parties will endorse decentralization because this may provide 
national minorities or stateless with group-based territorial rights, defuse conflict by 
‘containing nationalism’34 or decentralizing political tensions.35 In contrast, culturally 
conservative parties will be even more strongly opposed to decentralization as recognizing 
and empowering regional groups may weaken national identity and the national community. 
Thus, our third contextual hypothesis is: 
H5: Cultural liberalism is more associated with support for decentralization when there is a 
regionally-based ethnic group. 
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Regionalist party ideology 
A final contextual factor is the ideology of regionalist parties. While such parties usually 
concentrate on the need for decentralization, they also adopt positions on the economic and 
cultural dimensions.
36
 For example, the Scottish SNP is traditionally on the economic left and 
culturally liberal, the Catalonian CiU is relatively centrist in economic and cultural terms, and 
the Belgian Vlaams Belang is on the economic right and culturally conservative. Where they 
exist, regionalist parties may use their blackmail or coalition potential to persuade state-wide 
parties to acknowledge and consider demands for territorial autonomy, self-determination or 
independence.
37
 Which parties are threatened by regionalist competitors will depend on each 
state-wide party’s economic and cultural policies and the area of the policy space it thus 
occupies.
38
  
State-wide parties may respond to this threat by strategically adopting positions on 
decentralization in order to maximize their share of vote and to attain office rather than out of 
ideological considerations.
39
 A state-wide party can respond to a threat from a regionalist 
party by adopting an accommodative or adversarial strategy.
40
 If it is directly threatened, it 
may adopt an accommodating strategy, taking up a pro-decentralization stance in order to 
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challenge a regionalist party’s ownership of the decentralization issue, recoup electoral losses 
and avoid losing future votes. If it is not directly threatened, but its state-wide competitors are, 
it may adopt an adversarial strategy, taking up an anti-decentralization stance in order to 
distinguish itself from its state-wide rival and to raise the salience of decentralization, in the 
hope that regionalist parties continue to sap votes from its state-wide rival. For example, if a 
regionalist party has a centre-left economic position, such as the Scottish and Welsh 
nationalists in the UK, then an economic left-wing state-wide party would adopt an 
accommodative strategy, while economically right-wing party would follow an adversarial 
strategy.
41
 The opposite prediction would hold if the regionalist party was on the economic 
right. In essence, we thus argue that electoral strategies can overcome the associations 
between decentralization and the core ideological dimensions. Our hypothesis here is 
therefore: 
H6: The closer a regionalist party’s ideological position is to that of a state-wide party, the 
more that state-wide party supports decentralization. 
 
Data and model 
Ideological scales 
To test our hypotheses, we need information on party positions on decentralization as well as 
on the economic and cultural dimensions. Our source of data in this paper is the expert survey 
of party positions carried out by Benoit and Laver in 2002 and 2003.
42
  This survey contains 
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Project (Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 2006). While these also measure the presence 
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assessments of party ideology on economic and cultural matters as well as on 
decentralization. After excluding those countries not listed as fully ‘free’ by Freedom House 
in 200343 and four countries with missing values on key controls44, thirty-one countries 
remain in this dataset.
45
 We present results using this expert survey rather than the newer 
Hooghe et al. data, which also includes questions on these three issue areas; we do so because 
the Hooghe et al. survey only covers EU countries.
46
 We also ran all analyses and robustness 
checks using the Hooghe et al. data, and the results are consistent across these two datasets 
                                                                                                                                                   
and direction of statements on decentralization, manifesto data is probably best suited to 
analyses of issue salience (cf. Mazzoleni 2009). 
43
 These are: Albania, Belarus, Bosnia, Macedonia, Moldova, Russia, Serbia, Ukraine and 
Turkey. We also dropped Israel (due to missing information on the decentralization 
dimension), New Zealand (due to missing information on social policy) and Northern Ireland.  
44 Specifically, we have no information on the level of regional self-rule for Cyprus, Iceland, 
Luxembourg and Malta. Our results hold if these four small countries are added to the sample. 
45
 The thirty-one countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, 
Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. The full 
list of parties we include can be found in Appendix 2. Belgium is included in the analysis 
even though there are no state-wide parties in Belgium since the late 1970s, when the party 
system bifurcated along linguistic lines. We focus specifically in this country on political 
parties that are not regionalist or separatist parties, i.e. those that originated as parties with a 
polity-wide vocation, that represent one of the mainstream political ideologies, and that tend 
to enter coalition governments together as party families comprised of two ‘sister’ parties.   
46
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(details available from the authors).  
As noted above, decentralization is a multifaceted process that may take various 
different forms and meanings across countries, as the term may refer to (1) different types of 
institutional change and (2) different levels of governance (e.g., regional or local). For 
example, in multi-national states such as Spain decentralization includes both an institutional 
as well as a cultural component
47
, while in the UK the cultural component is less salient, at 
least for state-wide parties. In homogeneous states such Denmark, decentralization may 
simply mean the shift of administrative powers to regions or the transfer of expenditure 
powers to municipalities. This variation in the meaning of decentralization makes it difficult 
to obtain a single valid cross-national measure for the position of parties on decentralization. 
However, there is currently simply no better alternative measure of decentralization 
available.48 Moreover, it is precisely one aim of this paper to uncover differing interpretations 
of decentralization across countries, by capturing the effect of the economic and cultural 
dimension and of contextual factors on party positioning. 
 In the Benoit and Laver survey, experts were asked to assess party positions on 
decentralization. Low values on this scale mean the party ‘promotes decentralization of all 
administration and decision-making’ and high values mean the party ‘opposes any 
decentralization of all administration and decision-making’. A histogram and rug plot of party 
positions on decentralization are presented in Figure 1, which shows that non-regional parties 
do differ substantially on their position on this topic, though no such parties take particularly 
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 Maddens and Libbrecht 2008. 
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extreme views.
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Figure 1. Party positions on decentralization 
 
Note: Data from Benoit and Laver 2006. Countries included listed in footnote 45, parties 
included in Appendix 2.  
 
To assess positions on the economic dimension, we make use of the public services 
versus taxes scale, where low values mean that the party ‘promotes cutting public services to 
cut taxes’ and high values that it ‘promotes raising taxes to increase public services’. 
Measuring the cultural dimension is less straightforward. In this paper, we use party 
attitudes towards personal freedoms and traditional values. In the Benoit and Laver survey, 
this scale is called the ‘social policy’ dimension: low values signify that the party ‘opposes 
liberal policies on matters such as abortion, homosexuality and euthanasia’ and high values 
that it favours such policies.49 This question only cover part of the issues that comprise the 
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cultural dimension, as topics such as nationalism and immigration are not included.
50
 To make 
sure that our results do not depend on the measurement of the cultural dimension, we also ran 
all our analyses using the immigration or the nationalism scale where available as well as with 
indices constructed by taking the average of the immigration/nationalism and social policy 
scales. Our results do not change when these alternative measures are used. 
 We model our dependent variable, decentralization, using linear regression. Since our 
data structure is best described as hierarchical (parties nested in countries), we run a 
multilevel model with country-level random intercepts. Crucially, setting up the model in this 
ways recognizes the potentially clustered nature of our observations while allowing us to 
include country-level controls and cross-level interaction effects. All models are run using the 
xtmixed command in Stata 11.
51
 
 
Contextual factors 
We argued above that the influence of the economic and cultural dimension on 
decentralization positions may depend on a series of contextual factors. First, we measure the 
existing level of decentralization using the Marks et al. measure of self-rule, which is the 
extent to which sub-national units can run their own affairs independently of central 
government.52 We take the country-wide average for the period including 2002-2003, the 
years in which the Benoit and Laver survey was carried out. Countries such as Belgium, 
Spain, Italy and Germany have high values on this variable, and countries such as the Baltic 
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 While Benoit and Laver did ask about party positions on nationalism and immigration in 
some countries, only the social policy scale is available for all thirty-one countries. 
51 Our results do not change if we run the models with robust standard errors clustered by 
country. 
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States, Bulgaria, Portugal and Slovenia have low values.  
Second, we measure the regional disparity in economic prosperity using information 
on NUTS 2 regions for EU countries53 and on OECD-defined regions for all other countries54. 
For each country, we calculate the coefficient of variation (i.e. the standard deviation divided 
by the mean) of GDP per capita across all regions.
55
 This variable captures the extent to which 
regional mean prosperity varies within a country.
56
 Countries with notably high regional 
disparity include Belgium, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia and the UK; in contrast, Australia, 
Japan and the Netherlands have low levels of inequality between regions.  
 Third, we measure whether a country has a regionally-based ethnic group using 
information provided in the Ethnic Power Relations dataset and its geographic supplement.
57
 
We code ethnopolitically relevant groups as regionally concentrated if they are either only or 
partly regionally-based.58 The resulting variable is 1 if the country has a regionally-based 
ethnic group, and 0 if not.  
                                                
53 Eurostat 2012. 
54
 OECD 2012. 
55
 We use 2003 data for countries where we use Benoit and Laver data. The two exceptions 
are Denmark, where data is only available from 2005, and Switzerland, where the most recent 
data we found was from 1995. 
(http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/de/index/themen/04/02/05/key/gesamtes_volkseinkomme
n.html). 
56
 The three Baltic countries Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are coded as having 0 regional 
disparity as they no separate regional values are provided by Eurostat. 
57 Cederman et al. 2009; Wucherpfennig et al. 2011. 
58 We exclude the largest ethnopolitically relevant group, which is generally the dominant 
group (e.g. the English in the UK). 
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 Finally, we assess the extent to which regionalist parties take a stance on the economic 
position that is similar to that of the state-wide party. To measure this, we first need to classify 
which parties are regionalist parties. Parties were initially coded as regionalist parties if they 
were given the equivalent party code in the Comparative Manifestos Project dataset or in the 
Hooghe et al. survey.
59
 We then consolidated these codes given our own country-specific 
knowledge in order to remove state-wide nationalist parties from this categorization. We then 
coded the average position of regionalist parties as the mean position of these parties on each 
of the two ideological scales, weighted by their share of the vote in general elections.  
See Appendix 1 for the specific country-level values of these contextual factors. 
 
Party-level controls 
We include as controls three party-level variables that may strongly influence decentralization 
positions. First, parties that participate in government at the national level may be less likely 
to support decentralization: they have an incentive to maintain the status quo in the division of 
power between the different levels of governance in order to widen their room for manoeuvre. 
Devolving power to lower levels may also mean handing power to other parties that are sub-
nationally strong.60 We measure government participation at the time of the survey using 
information provided by Benoit and Laver (Appendix B) directly.61 We code parties as 1 if 
they were in government, 0 if not.  
Second, parties may have a strategic incentive to take a position different to that of 
their competitors. In other words, the more the government (opposition) parties are in favour 
of decentralization, the more the opposition (government) parties will be against it. For 
                                                
59 Budge et al. 2001; Hooghe et al. 2010; Klingemann et al. 2006. 
60 O'Neill 2003. 
61
 Benoit and Laver 2006. 
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example, this pattern was found in the rivalry between state-wide parties in countries such as 
France or Greece, where social democratic parties favoured decentralization during their long 
spell in opposition to Conservative governing parties. We thus include a variable measuring 
the mean position of the government (for opposition parties) and of the opposition (for 
government parties), weighted by their vote share.  
Finally, smaller parties may be more likely to support decentralization. This is because 
they may want to ‘shake up the party system’ by taking a position in favor of change.62 There 
is evidence that small parties are more likely to be Eurosceptic;63 a similar pattern may exist 
for the decentralization issue. We measure party size using the most recent party vote share 
information provided in the Benoit and Laver dataset. The variable ranges from 0 to 1.  
 
Country-level controls 
We also include a series of country-level controls in all models. These include some of the 
contextual factors introduced above, namely the level of self-rule, the degree of regional 
economic disparity and the presence of regionally-based ethnic groups. We also include as a 
control whether the party system includes a regionalist party or not, because the presence of 
such parties may polarize the positions of state-wide parties, especially if the decentralization 
issue takes on high salience. Depending on the responses of state-wide parties, we may see 
more positive or more negative stances on decentralization as a result. Though we are 
uncertain of the direction of the influence of the presence of regionalist party, this is 
nevertheless an important control variable.  
Support for decentralization by state-wide parties may also be greater in 
geographically and demographically large countries. If a country is large, there may be a 
                                                
62 Marks et al. 2002, 588. 
63
 Hix and Lord 1997; Taggart 1998. 
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greater heterogeneity of local conditions and voter preferences, and thus a greater need and 
support for locally-tailored policies.64 We coded the geographic size of a country from the 
United Nations Demographic Yearbook.65 This is measured in square kilometres. The 2002 
population of a country is taken from Heston et al. and measured in millions.
66
 For both area 
and population, we use the natural logarithm of the raw values in our models. 
 
Results 
The results of our model are presented in Table 1. The dependent variable, which ranges from 
1 to 20, is coded so that positive values indicate support for decentralization.  
 
Decentralization and ideological dimensions 
In the Table, Model 1 presents the simple results, without controls, for the influence of the 
two ideological dimensions on party positions on decentralization. In Model 2, we add the 
controls for government participation, the mean position of the government/opposition, party 
size, the presence of a regionalist party, the presence of a regionally-based ethnic group, the 
level of self-rule, and the logged geographic area and population size.  
                                                
64 Schakel 2010; De Vries 2000. 
65 UN 2008. 
66
 Heston et al. 2009. 
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Table 1 Results from multilevel linear regression model predicting decentralization positions 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Ideological 
dimensions
Dimensions + 
controls
Level of self-rule
Regional economic 
disparity
Regionally-based 
ethnic group
Countries with 
regionalist parties
Distance from 
regionalist parties
Economic dimension 0.283*** (0.048) 0.294*** (0.047) 0.080 (0.087) 0.287*** (0.048) 0.062 (0.096) 0.322*** (0.076) 0.293*** (0.075)
Cultural dimension -0.236*** (0.038) -0.247*** (0.036) -0.260** (0.036) -0.284*** (0.047) -0.241*** (0.035) -0.281*** (0.057) -0.267*** (0.056)
Vote share  -4.223** (1.585) -4.732** (1.567) -4.218** (1.580) -3.921* (1.563) -4.842 (3.143) -4.417 (3.035)
Gov. participation  -0.123 (0.443) -0.019 (0.437) -0.060 (0.445) -0.190 (0.437) -0.069 (0.725) -0.314 (0.705)
Mean government/opposition position  -0.654*** (0.172) -0.622*** (0.169) -0.628*** (0.173) -0.621*** (0.169) -0.518* (0.261) -0.335 (0.261)
Level of self-rule  -0.041 (0.039) -0.243** (0.079) -0.039 (0.039) -0.041 (0.039) -0.068 (0.058) -0.061 (0.058)
Regionally-based ethnic group  0.829* (0.386) 0.786* (0.380) -0.072 (0.824) 0.822* (0.380) -0.133 (0.738) -0.113 (0.711)
Country with regionalist party  -1.604*** (0.425) -1.408*** (0.423) -1.546*** (0.426) -1.500*** (0.420)   
Area (logged)  0.065 (0.171) 0.051 (0.168) 0.066 (0.171) 0.053 (0.169) 0.297 (0.300) 0.325 (0.290)
Population (logged)  0.042 (0.251) 0.069 (0.247) 0.038 (0.250) 0.020 (0.247) 0.272 (0.485) 0.304 (0.469)
Regional economic disparity  1.304 (1.420) 0.757 (1.407) 1.351 (1.416) -8.305* (3.73) 3.516 (2.362) 2.151 (2.337)
Economic dimension X self-rule   0.020** (0.007)     
Economic dimension X regional 
economic disparity    0.083 (0.067)    
Cultural dimension X regionally-
based ethnic group     0.900** (0.324)   
Regionalist party distance
Economic dimension       -0.279** (0.105)
Cultural dimension       0.083 (0.077)
Intercept 10.68*** (0.534) 14.00*** (2.203) 16.44*** (2.318) 14.26*** (2.205) 16.43*** (2.336) 8.930* (3.479) 8.900** (3.416)
-2log likelihood -571.64 -555.77 551.58 -555.01 -551.97 -217.00 -213.63
AIC 1153.28 1139.54 1133.15 1140.02 1133.95 460.01 457.27
N (parties) 232 232 232 232 232 91 91
N (countries) 31 31 31 31 31 12 12
 
Note: The outcome variable in all regressions is party position on decentralization, scaled from 1 to 20, with 20 the most positive stance; standard 
errors in parentheses; ***: p<0.001, **: p<0.01, *: p<0.05.
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We find strong support for the claim that decentralization raises questions of identity 
on the one hand and efficiency and redistribution on the other, since we find that the core 
ideological dimensions of political contestation are clearly associated with the positioning of 
parties on decentralization. We can see in Models 1 and 2 that positions on the cultural 
dimension affect party positions on decentralization in the expected manner: the more 
culturally conservative a party, the more it opposes decentralization. For the economic 
dimension, our findings indicate that the further parties are to the right, the more they support 
decentralization. The magnitude of the effect of the two dimensions is similar, with the 
economic dimension appearing to have the somewhat stronger influence. We therefore find 
strong support for H1 and H2. 
The effect of these two variables is shown in Figure 2 by plotting the predicted values 
on the decentralization issue depending on the party’s position on the socio-economic and the 
socio-cultural dimensions (using the results from Model 2). All other variables are held at 
their mean except for government participation and the presence of a regionalist party, which 
are both set to 0. The darker the shaded portion of the graph, the more in favour of 
decentralization a party is predicted to be. We can see that an economically left-wing, 
culturally conservative party would be clearly against decentralization, while its ideological 
opposite – a culturally liberal, economically right-wing party – would be expected to strongly 
favour decentralization. Those parties in the diagonal from the bottom left to the top right are 
expected to take relatively centrist positions on decentralization.
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Figure 2. Predicted decentralization positions by ideological dimension 
 
 
Note: Predicted values for party positions on decentralization on a 1-20 scale based on Model 
2. Higher values indicate greater support for decentralization. Presence of a regional party, 
presence of a regionally-based and disadvantaged ethnic minority, and government 
participation set to 0; all other variables held at their mean. 
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Of the control variables, we find effects for two of our party-level variables (party size 
and government-opposition rivalry). There is thus evidence that smaller parties tend to favour 
decentralization. We also find that there is an effect of government-opposition rivalry: the 
more the government (opposition) is in favour of decentralization, the more the opposition 
(government) will oppose it, and vice versa. This confirms the notion that decentralization is 
used strategically as an element of competition between state-wide parties, both in and out of 
power, that wish to distinguish themselves form their main rival.67 The presence of regionally-
based ethnic groups and regionalist parties also matters. If there is a regionally-based ethnic 
group but no regionalist party, then state-wide parties are on average slightly more favourable 
towards decentralization. If there is a regionalist party, then state-wide parties are less 
supportive of decentralization. Interestingly, the only control variables close to significance 
are those that reflect state-wide parties’ strategic considerations: their size and the positions 
and presence of competitors in or out of office. Institutional and structural factors such as the 
level of self-rule, the presence of a regionally-based ethnic group and regional economic 
disparity matter little. Decentralization is thus an issue that can be manipulated strategically 
for partisan advantage.  
 
Contextual factors 
How does the influence of the two ideological dimensions vary based on contextual factors? 
Specifically, does it depend on the degree of self-rule, the degree of regional economic 
disparity, and the presence of a regionally-based ethnic group? We test our hypotheses by 
interacting our ideological scales with these country-level variables. Again, Table 1 presents 
the regression results. 
To test Hypothesis 3, we interact the positions on the economic dimension with the 
                                                
67
 O’Neill 2003. 
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level of self-rule. The results are presented in Model 3 in Table 1. The interaction effect is 
significant. Figure 3 plots the marginal effect of the economic dimension depending on the 
level of self-rule.68 The histogram underlying the graph shows the distribution of sample 
values of self-rule. The result is clear: the greater the level of self-rule, the more economic 
ideology is associated with positions on decentralization. The economic right is predicted to 
be more in favour of decentralization than the economic left mainly when the level of self-rule 
is relatively high. The effect of economic policy positions on decentralization positions is 
around 0.5 in countries with a high level of self-rule (i.e. around 20) but close to 0 in countries 
with low levels of self-rule (i.e. around 0). This means that we have strong support for H3.
69
                                                
68
 Brambor et al. 2006. 
69
 An interaction term between cultural ideology and the level of self-rule is not statistically 
significant. Thus, the association between cultural ideology and decentralization positions 
does not differ by levels of self-rule. The influence of the logic of identity on the position of 
state-wide is consistent across different types of states, whether unitary, regionalised or 
federal. 
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Figure 3. The effect of socio-economic position conditional on average self-rule 
 
Note: Based on Model 3. Graph shows predicted marginal effect of a one-unit 
increase (i.e. rightward shift) in a party’s economic position conditional on a country’s level 
of self-rule. Grey bars show the distribution of values of self-rule in the sample countries. 
‘Pipes’ below histogram show individual country values of regional GDP disparity. 
 
To test hypothesis H4, we interact the positions on the economic dimension with the 
values for regional economic disparity. The results are presented in Model 4 in Table 1. 
Again, we plot the marginal effect of the economic dimension conditional on the degree of 
regional economic disparity (Figure 4). We find clear support for H4: the greater the level of 
economic disparity between a country’s regions, the more economic positions are associated 
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with decentralization positions.
70
 At high levels of regional disparity, so values of around .4, 
we expect a clear association between economic ideology and decentralization positions. In 
contrast, when regional disparity in GDP per capita is low, then we expect a weak association 
between views on the economic dimension and views on decentralization.
71
 
 
                                                
70
 Running the analysis without the three Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), 
coded here as having 0 regional disparity in GDP per capita, does not affect our substantive 
results. While the interaction term is no longer significant, the change in the marginal effect is 
very similar in magnitude. 
71 Countries with such levels of economic disparity include Belgium, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Romania, the UK and the US. Countries with low levels of regional disparity (i.e. 
below .2) include Australia, Denmark, Greece, Japan, the Netherlands and Sweden. 
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Figure 4. The effect of socio-economic position conditional on regional GDP disparity 
 
Note: Based on Model 4. Graph shows predicted marginal effect of a one-unit increase (i.e. 
rightward shift) in a party’s economic position conditional on a country’s level of regional 
economic disparity in GDP per capita. Grey bars show the distribution of values of economic 
disparity in the sample countries. ‘Pipes’ below histogram show individual country values of 
regional GDP disparity. 
 
To test Hypothesis 5, we interact positioning on the cultural dimensions with the 
presence of a regionally-based ethnic group. The results are presented in Model 5. The results 
do not support our hypothesis. Instead, the association between positions on the cultural 
dimension and on decentralization are, if anything, a little weaker when there is regionally-
based ethnic group. However, this difference in association is not significant. Overall, there is 
clearly no evidence that the impact of the cultural dimension is greater when there is a 
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regionally-based ethnic group in the country.
72
  
Our final contextual effect (H6) concerned the effect of the ideology of regionalist 
parties and how this influences the strategic incentives of state-wide parties. We test this 
hypothesis by adding two additional variables that measure the distance of the state-wide 
party’s position from the (weighted) mean position of regionalist parties on both the economic 
and the cultural dimensions. Our sample is reduced to the twelve countries where a regionalist 
party competes. Models 6 and 7 in Table 1 present the results; Model 6 re-runs the main 
model for the reduced sample and Model 7 adds the new distance terms.  
What we can see in Model 7 is that the ideological position of regionalist parties matters a lot, 
but only on the economic dimension. We illustrate this in Figure 5. Here, we calculate 
predicted positions on decentralization as in Figure 1. In Figure 5, the state-wide party’s 
economic ideology is on the x-axis and the state-wide party’s distance from the weighted 
mean position of regionalist parties on economic ideology is on the y-axis. The area in the 
centre at the top is left blank as these are arithmetically impossible values. For example, a 
party at 10.5 on the 1-20 scale can only ever be 9.5 units distant from other parties. When 
moving from left to right, the Figure clearly shows the previous pattern establishing an 
association between right-wing economic views and support for decentralization. When 
moving from the low to high values on the y axis, we see that support for decentralization 
decreases as the distance from regionalist parties increases. In other words, when the average 
economic position of regionalist parties is close to that of the state-wide party, the state-wide 
                                                
72
 Some of the regionally-based ethnic groups in our sample are very small, such as Slovenes 
in Austria and Okinawans in Japan (see Appendix 1). If we only count ethnic groups that 
make up more than 5 per cent of the national population, then our results change only insofar 
as the effect of the cultural dimension is significantly lower in countries with large regionally-
based ethnic groups, thus providing even stronger evidence against our hypothesis. 
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party chooses a more accommodative strategy and supports decentralization more. When the 
regionalist parties are on average more distant ideologically, the state-wide party chooses a 
more adversarial ideology, so supports decentralization less.  This may help to explain 
patterns of party competition in the UK, where the Labour party, threatened by the left-wing 
SNP, endorsed devolution, a position that was rejected by the Conservative party. Similarly, 
the right-wing Flemish regionalist parties forced the Christian Democratic and Liberal parties 
to adopt more ardently decentralist stances that contrast with the resilient centralism of the 
Socialist party. Thus, we find strong support for H6, but only for economic ideology.
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Figure 5. The effect of regionalist party positions 
 
Note: Predicted values for party positions on decentralization on a 0-10 scale based on Model 
7. Higher values indicate greater support for decentralization. Presence of a regional party, 
presence of a regionally-based and disadvantaged ethnic minority, and government 
participation set to 0; all other variables held at their mean.
36 
 
Discussion and conclusion  
In this paper, our aim has been to follow the encouragement of Marks and Hooghe to ‘bring 
politics into the study of institutional choice’73 by focusing on how decentralization debates 
tap into questions of efficiency, redistribution and identity and by analysing how ideology 
shapes the views of state-wide parties on the territorial allocation of authority. We have 
shown that the positions that state-wide parties take on decentralization depend on their 
ideological views on the economic and cultural dimensions. Parties on the economic right are 
more supportive of decentralization than parties on the economic left, while culturally liberal 
parties favour decentralization more than culturally conservative parties.  
This finding is important because it highlights the necessity of going beyond the 
simple left-right dimension for understanding party preferences on decentralization, an issue 
of jurisdictional architecture which, like European integration, taps into two separate logics. 
The two dimensions may reinforce each other:  culturally liberal, economically right-wing 
parties are expected to be most in favour of decentralization, while their ideological opposites 
should be least supportive. Yet most parties, especially in Western Europe, do not combine 
the two dimensions in this way, as cultural liberalism tends to be associated with left-wing 
economic views and cultural conservatism with right-wing economic views.
74
 Marks et al. 
have noted that this pattern can cause tension concerning whether or not to support European 
integration: for example, many right-wing parties are ‘rifted between nationalism and market 
liberalism’.
75
 This may apply to decentralization as well, with culturally liberal parties on the 
economic left torn between redistribution and recognizing diversity and culturally 
conservative parties on the economic right between economic efficiency and nationalism. 
                                                
73 Marks and Hooghe 2000, 811. 
74 Kriesi et al. 2008; Marks et al. 2006; van der Brug and van Spanje 2010. 
75
 Marks et al. 2006, 170. 
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Further research should investigate in detail the internal rifts that these contradictory 
ideological motivations may cause, and how they are managed by individual state-wide 
parties. 
In addition to these general patterns, we also hypothesized that the association 
between economic and cultural ideology and party views on decentralization depend on the 
individual country context. What we found is that this is true only for economic ideology, 
which is associated with decentralization positions more when economic disparity between 
regions or the level of self-rule is high. In addition, state-wide parties also react to the 
strategic incentives presented by the economic positions taken by regionalist parties. If 
regionalist parties take up similar economic positions, then state-wide parties adopt an 
accommodative strategy to counter the threat; if regionalist parties take up a distant economic 
position, then state-wide parties will pursue an adversarial strategy. Given the static nature of 
the analysis, we can only demonstrate a strong association; we cannot demonstrate the 
dynamic effect of competitive interactions on state-wide party position over time. We found 
no evidence of contextual effects on the influence cultural dimension. These results show that 
the link between economic ideology and views on decentralization is dependent upon on 
country context:  the way in which decentralization relates to the logics of efficiency and 
redistribution depends on individual country institutional, structural and strategic factors. 
These findings have implications for our understanding of politics in systems of multi-
level governance and go some way towards building a causal theory of authority allocation, 
by offering insight into how ideology, rooted in a specific country context, shapes the ‘mind-
set’ of agents responsible for determining the actual territorial distribution of power. They 
also raise several questions that deserve further investigation.  
First, this article has concentrated on party positions at one point in time. Future work 
should introduce a dynamic element to the analysis to see if and how state-wide parties 
change their positions on decentralization over time, and what lies behind these shifts in 
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position. Further research should seek to examine the effects of competitive interactions and 
the salience of decentralization on the changes in party positions over time and across 
countries.76 When do parties change their position, when does decentralization become 
politicized, and how does this influence decisions to reform the territorial allocation of 
power?
77
  
Second, research on the process of decentralization in different countries could benefit 
from an explicitly party-political approach to understanding the timing and tempo of 
territorial reforms.78 Future research should examine how party- and country-specific factors 
such as party organization, party competition and institutional arrangements condition the 
effect of ideology and structure the incentives of state-wide parties to either endorse or oppose 
decentralization. 
Finally, the European Union’s jurisdictional architecture, particularly in monetary and 
fiscal affairs, is currently contested based on different views on efficiency, redistribution and 
identity.79 Given the salience of such polarization, how do parties’ views on decentralization 
and on European integration fit together? Are party positions on both topics driven by the 
same logics? Future work should investigate if and how party positions on the different levels 
of governance are connected.  
                                                
76
 This theoretical development however needs to be preceded by a significant data collection 
effort that aims to establish a time series of party position, salience, directional intensity and 
certainty, across the different dimensions of decentralization (see fn.48). 
77 Hooghe and Marks 2009. 
78 cf. Massetti and Toubeau 2013.  
79
 Hooghe and Marks 2009. 
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